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1. Introduction 
To cope with suffering and death was one of the central tasks of philosophy in the classical 
world. The ultimate aim of doing philosophy was to attain the happy life and thus to seek for 
remedies against fear and pain. “O philosophy,” Cicero exclaims, “you in your bounty have 
given me tranquility of life and have taken away the fear of death.”1 As Pierre Hadot and 
other scholars have pointed out, the young Augustine inherited this tradition of philosophical 
therapy and integrated it into his newly embraced Christian faith.
2
  
Scholarship has largely focussed on the Platonic nature of Augustine’s early stance 
towards death. The early Augustine saw death as a good, as it released the soul from the 
bodily impediments to the vision of God.
3
 A mature Christian would even long for the 
separation of body and soul and consider death as the greatest of gifts that can be granted to 
him.
4
 To the early Augustine, not the resurrection of the body, but the immortality of the soul 
was his primary consolation in the face of death.  
In this paper, I would like to leave the discussion of Augustine’s early relationship to 
Platonism as it stands, and focus on a comparison between Epicurean and Stoic methods of 
consolation and the one Augustine develops in his early works, particularly in De vera 
religione. I would like to show how Augustine’s creational alternative to Stoic and Epicurean 
physics affects his view on how to deal with suffering and death as a Christian.  
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2. The Stoic approach to death 
In order to understand the Stoic approach to death, we have to begin with Stoic physics. 
Characteristic of Stoic physics is its materialist understanding of the world. Everything that 
exists, including God and the soul, consists of matter. Nonetheless, the Stoics distinguish 
between an active and a passive principle in reality, a substance that forms and a substance 
that is formed. The active principle, called god or providence, or eternal law, consists of fire 
and structures the whole of reality. Everything in the universe happens according to this law, 
and has a function within the greater whole. For this reason, one cannot say that human death 
or decay, or whatever happens to us against our will, is evil, or against nature. Everything that 
happens, must happen, according to the deterministic movement of the universe.  
This deterministic view of reality is foundational for Stoic ethics. The good life, 
according to the Stoics, consists in the souls’ adaptation to the necessary order of nature.5 As 
rational beings, whose soul derives from the rational principle of the universe, we are most 
properly ourselves if we move along with the rational order of the universe. This means that 
we should not desire more than nature allots to us,
6
  but rather use what it grants us and accept 
what it takes away. This way of life is what the Stoics call ‘virtuous’ or ‘noble’.  
This way of life results in the heroic attitude towards suffering for which the Stoics 
have become famous. Seneca summarizes this attitude as follows: “[Virtue knows] that every 
hardship that time brings comes by a law of nature, and like a good soldier she will submit to 
wounds… and as she dies she will love him for whose sake she falls – her commander; she 
will keep in mind that old injuction: “Follow God”.”7  
Death, then, is nothing else than the last command of this divine commander. Just as 
with all forms of suffering, we live most happily if we embrace death as it comes and refuse 
to be disturbed by irrational fear about it in advance. With regard to the state of man after 
death, Stoicism held the view that death either annihilates us altogether, or releases the soul 
from the limitations of this life and brings it into a happier state, until the moment of universal 
conflagration, when everything, including human souls, will return to the divine fire and 
everything will start all over again.
8
 The mythic idea of divine punishment after death is 
rejected, at least in any lasting form.
9
 These notions of the afterlife render death largely 
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indifferent. Happiness in the face of death and suffering is to be sought in joyful acceptance of 
life and death as nature grants it to us.  
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3. The Epicurean approach to death 
The Epicurean approach to suffering and death both differs from and agrees with the Stoic 
approach. Contrary to the Stoic view of the universe, Epicurean physics denies that there is a 
rational principle that orders the universe and from which the human soul derives. Reality 
consists of atoms and a void which enables the atoms to move. When atoms come  together in 
particular arrangements they form compounded bodies, such as human bodies. These bodies, 
however, do not have any internal stability beyond the temporal colliding of atoms. There is 
no (divine) intention behind the composition of the human person, nor an immortal soul that 
continues in existence after death. When we die, personal identity dissolves in the flux of 
matter.
10
] The good life, then, is found in ataraxia, a state of the mind in which one’s basic 
bodily needs are met and in which the desire to overcome one’s limitations as a mortal being 
have ceased to exist. To reach this state of mind, however, two impediments have to be 
overcome, namely the fear of death and the fear of the gods.
11
  Epicurean therapy aims to take 
away these fears.  
According to Epicurus the gods do exist, but they do not interfere with humans, as 
they enjoy a perpetual state of happiness and do not need anything from mortals. Therefore, 
we do not have to fear their anger in this life. With regard to death, Epicurus’ answer is 
simple: there is no consciousness after death. Or, as Lucretius, the Latin poet who 
summarized Epicurus’ thought in his poem De rerum natura, put it: “Therefore death to us is 
nothing, nor concerns us in the least. Since nature of mind is mortal evermore.”12 As the 
popular version of Epicureanism goes, engraved on many Roman tombstones: “I was not; I 
was; I am not; I do not care.”13 In this way, Epicureanism tries to heal the fear of death.When 
we are dead, it is as if we never existed. Therefore, we cannot experience death as an evil. 
Death itself cannot be an evil, because there is no subject that experiences it as such.  
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3. Augustine’s early reception and critique of Stoic and Epicurean philosophies 
As has been argued by scholars such as Colish, O’Daly and Van Dusen, Augustine’s early 
writings testify that he was well acquainted with Stoic and Epicurean philosophy.
14
 In Contra 
Academicos Augustine depicts Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, as someone who believed that 
the soul is mortal; that nothing exists beyond the sensible world and that nothing happens in 
this world accept through a body. Zeno’s concept of God was therefore materialist and 
immanentist. God is identical with one of the four elements, namely fire.
15
 Augustine’s 
knowledge and use of Stoic ethics is reflected in his depiction of the Sage in De beata uita 25, 
to whom nothing happens against his will, because he has freed himself from dependence 
upon fortune.
16
  
Augustine’s early works also testify to his familiarity with Epicurean thought. In De 
magistro he mentions the Epicurean belief in the mortality of the soul.
17
 In De utilitate 
credendi he refers Lucretius’ description of the human soul: “… Lucretius writes that the soul 
consists of atoms and that after death it dissolves into these same atoms and perishes.”18 He 
also goes beyond the popular description of Epicureanism as mere satisfaction of bodily 
appetites by noting that Epicurus indeed acknowledged certain virtues, such as continence, 
although they are praised by him in the context of an hedonistic morality.
19
 Further, 
Augustine mentions Epicurean belief in the multiplicity of worlds,
20
 resulting from their belief 
that the universe is endless and therefore likely to contain more worlds like ours. 
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 How does Augustine’s approach to death relate to Stoic and Epicurean therapies? 
Augustine’s critique of both Stoicism and Epicureanism primarily targets their materialism. In 
several passages he rejects the philosophies of this world, referring to Colossians. 2:8 where 
Paul says that we should not be deceived by the philosophies and the elements of this world.
21
 
What characterizes these philosophies is that they seek ultimate truth in the world of sense, 
“so that the soul thinks that nothing exists but what is material.”22 Augustine also critiques the 
idea that the soul is of the same substance as God.
23
 This critique is primarily directed against 
the Manichean understanding of the soul, but by implication it also applies to Stoicism (and to 
Neoplatonism as well), which, just like Manichaeism, advocated the soul’s derivation from 
the divine fire and its material nature. 
 The common element in Augustine’s criticisms of these philosophies is that they all 
commit idolatry with creation.
24
 They cut creation off from its ontological dependence upon 
God its creator and make it into a kind of autonomous entity, enclosed into itself. In this view 
of reality, death and suffering simply belong to the make up of the universe. They are 
necessary facts of human life that have always existed and will always exist.  
 
4. The early Augustine’s Christian approach to death 
In contrast to these philosophies, Augustine comes to perceive death from the perspective of a 
theology of creation and fall. It must be conceded that this notion is not explicitly present 
from the beginning, but increasingly become so from De quantitate animae (388/89) onward. 
It is fully developed in De vera religione (391). 
Augustine comes to regard the human person, both soul and body, as having been 
created from nothing by God and as being utterly dependent upon God for the preservation of 
his spiritual and bodily life.
25
 Man, in his original state, would only stand out from 
nothingness as long as he would continue to take delight in God, the highest form of existence 
(summa essentia).
26
 In this way, soul and body would have remained the best in their kind, the 
soul receiving its life from God and the body from the soul. In other words, peace with God 
warranted the peace between body and soul.  
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Decay and corporeal death, then, resulted from the soul’s rebellion against God. The 
soul started to take delight in the life of the body and neglected its own life (God). Thus, it 
tended more towards nothingness and dragged the body with itself in its fall. This ‘bow’ of 
the soul to nothingness resulted in corporeal death and the pain that accompanies it.
27
 If the 
soul in its movement towards nothingness is not turned around, it will end up in “outer 
darkness”, where the soul, reunited to its former body,28 seeks for satisfaction of its desires, 
but will suffer endless torment, because there is no remembrence of God there.
29
 However, if 
the soul is reunited to the Creator, the decline of being in body and soul will be undone. Man 
will be restored and perfected in both body and soul.  
  
5. Augustine’s early Christian consolation (as opposed to the S/E) 
The difference between philosophical therapies of death and Augustine’s evolving Christian 
alternative is that Augustine disconnects death from its naturalistic framework. Death does not 
necessarily belong to the make-up of the universe (a presupposition that all classical thought 
shares), but is the contingent result of humanity’s broken relationship with its Creator. As 
such, corporeal death is on the one hand much more serious than Stoic and Epicurean 
philosophies can ever imagine, as it announces eternal separation from the Creator. On the 
other hand, it is far less serious, as it can be overcome by the Creator himself. And this is 
what the God of Christianity does for his people. 
In De vera religione Augustine praises the triune God as the one who gave being and 
form to us, through Son and Spirit, and also recreates those who have fallen away from him. 
He writes for example: “Through his [that is Christ’s] gift, which is given to the soul, that is 
holy Spirit, not only the soul to which it is given will become sound, peaceful and holy, but 
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even the body itself will be vivified and will be most beautiful in its own nature.”30 This is the 
Spirit, Augustine says, through whom non-being will be consumed by being, so that death 
will be no more.
31
  
This Spirit helps a Christian to cope with suffering and death, not by helping him to 
adjust to the limitations of life, but by inspiring him with the hope of the future life. “In all 
these laborious tasks (of coping with suffering), Augustine writes in De vera religione 92, 
“the Chrisitan is not dashed into peaces (frangitur), because he has the certain expectation of 
future rest.”32 This certain expectation, Augustine then adds, comes from the holy Spirit who 
has poured out the love of God in our hearts (Rom. 5:5). Through this love the Christian  “is 
not seriously upset by the death of anybody, because one who loves God with his whole being 
knows that he himself does not lose what God does not lose, as God is the Lord of both the 
living and dead.”33  
Although I need to further elaborate the development of the early Augustine’s 
Christian therapy against death, I hope to have made clear that Augustine in the five years 
following his conversion developed a profound Christian alternative to classical ways of 
dealing with the fear of death: a Christian overcomes the fear of suffering and death not by 
adapting to the necessities of life, but by being reconciled to a God who overcomes death 
itself.  
 
                                                                
30
 Vera rel. 25: “…dono etiam eius, quod animae datur, id est sancto spiritu, non solum anima cui datur salua et 
pacata et sancta fit, sed ipsum etiam corpus uiuificabitur eritque in natura sua mundissimum.” 
31
 Vera rel. 25, CCL 32, 203: Dicit et apostolus: uiuificabit et mortalia corpora uestra propter spiritum manentem 
in uobis [Rm 8,11]. ablato ergo peccato auferetur poena peccati; et ubi est malum? ubi est, mors, contentio tua? 
ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? [1 Cor 15,55] uincit enim essentia nihilum et sic absorbetur mors in uictoriam [1 Cor 
15,54]. Cf. mor. 1,64. 
32
 Vera rel. 92, CCL 32,247: “In omnibus autem officiosis laboribus futurae quietis certa exspectatione non 
frangitur.” Cf. the Seneca quote which says that ‘fortuita non frangant’ the virtuous man (Beata u. 3).  
33
 Vera rel. 91 (WSA 1/8, 91). 
